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THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION: THE SECRET POLITICAL
ACTIVITIES OF Two SUPREME COURT JUSTICES. By Bruce Allen Mur-
phy.t Oxford University Press, New York, New York, 1982. Pp. 473.
Reviewed by Alan Betten.tt
Between the time that Bruce Murphy originally wrote his man-
script innocuously entitled Justices as Politicians. The Extrajudicial.4c-
tivities of Justices Louis D. Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter, I and the
appearance of The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection.- The Secret Polit-
ical Activities of Two Supreme Court Justices,2 Murphy's editor at Ox-
ford University Press encouraged him to revise the book in order to
give it more market appeal.3 Evidently, Murphy's revisions proved
quite successful, given the prominent reviews and articles that attended
the book's publication.4 These articles, like Murphy's publisher,
tended to focus on the parts of the book that gave it market appeal
while only touching on Murphy's in-depth analysis of the intricate
political activities of Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter.' As a result,
this emphasis of the publisher and the media has served to partly over-
shadow the fact that Murphy has authored a solidly researched and
important book.
Murphy's book can be indirectly considered an expose of the ac-
tivities of Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter. The Brandeis/Frankfurter
Connection should not, however, be grouped with other post-Watergate
volumes which concern the venality and indiscretion of government of-
ficials. Rather, this book raises much larger issues concerning our sys-
tem of government.
At the outset of his book, Murphy explains that he wrote The
Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection to examine the extrajudicial activities
of Louis Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter.6 Murphy unravels his story,
for the most part, in chronological order demonstrating how Brandeis,
a "reflective moralist"7 appointed to the United States Supreme Court
t Assistant Professor of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University.
tt B.A., Brown University, 1973; M.A. Johns Hopkins University, 1976; J.D., Uni-
versity of Maryland School of Law, 1976; Ph.D. Candidate, Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity; Associate, Wolf, Pokempner & Hillman.
1. Levy & Murphy, Preserving the Progressive Spirit in a Conservative Time. The
Joint Reform Efforts of Justice Brandeis and Professor Frankfurter, 1916-1933, 78
MICH. L. REV. 1252, 1291 n.201 (1980).
2. The book is hereinafter cited as THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION.
3. Cover, The Framing of Justice Brandeis, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 5, 1982, at 21.
4. See, e.g., Margolick, 2 Justices' Friends Back Secret Role, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23,
1982, at 27, col. 1; Margolick, Brandeis Paid Frankfurter to Push His Political
Ideas, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1982, at A2, col. 2.
5. See sources cited supra note 4.
6. THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION 8.
7. Id. at 17.
in 1916,8 continued his political activities while on the bench.
As a result of the bitterness that attended Brandeis' nomination to
the Supreme Court, he realized that his appearance as an "interested
spectator"9 had to be curtailed with regard to important issues. Thus,
the need for some link or conduit outside the "Marble Palace" arose.
In order to act freely in the political field, Brandeis needed a lieutenant
who "[w]ould be his eyes and ears and. . . who [w]ould help him im-
plement his programs."'" This method of political participation, how-
ever, had distinct disadvantages. For instance, Brandeis was forced to
"rely on another to act in his behalf."" Moreover, this "technique also
required the right lieutenant, one who commanded Brandeis' complete
confidence as to ability and sense of discretion, who was well connected
in important circles, and who was both a philosophical ally and a kin-
dred spirit."' 2
Fortunately for Brandeis, there was a friend who was uniquely
qualified for the position in every way. This friend was Felix Frank-
furter, a thirty-three-year-old professor at the Harvard School of Law.
"[Thus], the mantle of political reform was passed on [from Justice
Louis Brandeis] to . . . Felix Frankfurter."' 3 The specific relationship
that developed between the two men-to implement Brandeis' political
programs-as Murphy accurately notes, is otherwise unprecedented in
the Supreme Court's history.' 4
Brandeis felt such confidence in acting through Frankfurter,
whom he called his "half-brother-half-son,"' 1 that he funded many of
Frankfurter's activities from 1916 through 1938. During this period,
Frankfurter's retainer increased from $1,000 to $3,500.16 This fee
defrayed Frankfurter's expenses in carrying out Brandeis' assigned
tasks, many of which were in accordance with Frankfurter's own polit-
ical inclinations. ' 7
With his "mechanism" ready for action, Brandeis soon became in-
volved in several undertakings necessitated by World War I. First, he
helped to streamline the governmental machinery which conducted the
war effort. Brandeis accomplished this task by suggesting radical
changes in the War Department, the War Industry Board and Commit-
8. Before Brandeis was appointed to the Supreme Court, he had a career as both
private attorney and People's Attorney, participating in the battles between Pro-
gressivism, the financial worlds, and the industrial worlds. Id at 19-28. More-
over, he also advised President Wilson on various issues of political importance.
Id
9. Id. at 29.
10. Id at 33.
11. Id
12. Id
13. Id
14. Id
15. Id at 39.
16. Id. at 41-42.
17. Id at 42-43.
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tees, and by securing for Frankfurter the chairmanship of the War La-
bor Policies Board. 8 Second, Brandeis sat in a number of cases that
concerned war-related matters that interested him. For example, he
heard numerous challenges to the Lever Food Control Bill, despite the
fact that he had personally advised the Food Administrator, Herbert
Hoover, regarding a strategy for securing the bill's passage in the Sen-
ate.' 9 Finally, Brandeis ensured that no agreement unfavorable to the
Zionist cause2" would result from an American mission sent to Turkey
to negotiate that country's withdrawal from the war.2'
Once the war ended, Brandeis turned much of his extrajudicial
attention to domestic legislative matters. Since Frankfurter had a
widespread reputation in the areas of public and administrative law,
federal jurisdiction, and legislative drafting, Brandeis utilized these tal-
ents in numerous ways. For example, Brandeis used Frankfurter as a
research assistant in the production of his judicial opinions.22 More-
over, he urged Frankfurter to encourage his bright Harvard Law
School students to explore and analyze issues of interest to Brandeis.23
The resulting articles either discussed various Court difficulties or criti-
cized the opinions of other justices with whom Brandeis disagreed.24
Brandeis then cited these articles in his opinions, as if theyZ truly repre-
sented "'the mandate of opinion in the Law Reviews."" In addition
to promoting this intellectual activity, Brandeis used Frankfurter's
close ties with various liberal publications, such as The New Republic,
to infuse their editorials or unsigned articles with Brandeis' beliefs,
sometimes transmitted almost verbatim by Frankfurter to the willing
editors.26
With the election of President Roosevelt in 1932, the "dynamic
duo" believed that they could proceed with their legislative efforts.
First, Roosevelt seemed to evoke some of the progressive liberal spirit
that infused Brandeis' and Frankfurter's work. Second, Frankfurter
considered himself to be a close friend of the President. 27 More impor-
tant, however, was that Brandeis could count on Frankfurter's ability
to mobilize the troops - Frankfurter's "Happy Hot Dog's" - the
young lawyers whom the professor had quickly placed in several agen-
cies, notably the Departments of Interior, Justice, and Agriculture.28
Unfortunately for Brandeis, as Murphy notes with arresting detail,
18. Id. at 51-53.
19. Id. at 54-55.
20. This was a cause in which Brandeis was extremely active.
21. Id. at 57-58.
22. Id. at 83.
23. Id. at 84.
24. Id. at 87-88.
25. Id. at 86.
26. Id at 89-91.
27. Id at 98-101.
28. Id. at 112-13.
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this period marked the beginning of the shift of Frankfurter's loyalty
from Brandeis to Roosevelt. 29 Although Frankfurter, with the aid and
ability of recruits such as Tom Corcoran and Ben Cohen,3" attempted
to forward Brandeis' goals, 3 the pragmatic Frankfurter was more will-
ing to work with the Brain Trusters - Roosevelt's other advisors such
as Raymond Moley and Rexford Tugwell.3 2 For example, during the
drafting and lobbying for the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933,
Frankfurter kept Moley constantly informed of the latest develop-
ments, including Brandeis' views.3 3
In Murphy's opinion, the ever-cautious Brandeis, perhaps because
he was both so confident in Frankfurter's ability to cover his tracks and
fearful of losing his final opportunity to implement his ideas, became
indiscreet in the expression of his opposition to the National Recovery
Administration (NRA).34 Brandeis preferred to solve the country's
business problems by use of the federal taxing power and not by the
fair-trade type of regulation embodied in the NRA. He talked several
times with General Hugh Johnson, the NRA head, and consistently
told him that the NRA bill was bad because it was impossible to en-
force, it endangered small industries, and it created an inefficiently
large enterprise. 35  During a subsequent radio broadcast, Johnson
stated that during his leadership of the NRA he had been in constant
touch with Brandeis.36 Although not fearful that Johnson's statement
could be verified, Brandeis had to fear an in-depth investigation that
might uncover his many extrajudicial activities.37 Nevertheless, when
the Supreme Court struck down the NRA,38 Brandeis summoned Cor-
coran and Cohen to his chambers and proceeded to threaten the ad-
ministration while breaking his own rule never to discuss Supreme
Court cases with anyone other than Frankfurter.39 As Murphy notes:
This was clearly not the same Louis D. Brandeis who was so
discrete and restrained in his early years on the Court. Not
only was he delivering threats to members of the administra-
tion, he . . . even dropped his one unwritten rule never to
discuss cases decided by the Court with anyone but Felix
Frankfurter. How highly unusual it is for a justice to discuss
29. Id at 102.
30. Id at 131-33.
31. Id at 104-05. These goals included massive government expenditures on public-
work projects and reforms in investment and banking practices.
32. Id at 106-11.
33. Id. at 134.
34. Id at 149.
35. Id at 145.
36. Id
37. Id at 147.
38. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), decided the
same day as Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), and
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Redford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
39. THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION 156.
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the implications of a decision by the Court cannot be over-
stressed . ... . The judicial opinion is supposed to speak for
itself- but it is even more unusual for a justice to frame that
discussion in such a way as to provide general political advice
on the new direction [that] the administration . . . [should
follow as a result of the Court's decision]. The statement that
'I drafted' seems clearly to have been an advisory statement
delivered to members of the administration regarding legisla-
tion not yet enacted.4"
Whether it was because Brandeis began to overreach his power or
because his assistants, notably Frankfurter, Corcoran, and Cohen, be-
gan to assert their independent power within the administration, Bran-
deis' effectiveness lessened as the New Deal entered its second phase.
For instance, although Brandeis' idea for a federal unemployment
compensation program was taken up by the administration, Frank-
furter did not strongly argue for the implementation of Brandeis' spe-
cific funding proposals. In fact, Frankfurter's "neutrality" when
discussing the matter with Roosevelt, and his failure to keep Brandeis
informed of some of the legislative activity, permitted the implementa-
tion of an alternative funding scheme that was opposed by Brandeis.4
In any case, Brandeis' influence with Roosevelt ended with his rather
open opposition to Roosevelt's court-packing plan in 1937. Frank-
furter, now practically confirmed in his loyalty to Roosevelt, objected
to Brandeis' opposition and to his delivering an advisory opinion on a
political issue." He found Brandeis' conduct to be "just as political as
the President's. '4 3 Frankfurter's viewpoint, however, appears some-
what pretentious in light of his prior relationship with Brandeis.
Once appointed to the Supreme Court in 1939, Frankfurter ver-
bally affirmed his allegiance to the tradition of judicial seclusion."
Nevertheless, he promptly began to husband his vast political resources
for one purpose - to help win the coming war by aiding the United
States' allies, especially Great Britain.4 5 Unlike Brandeis, who pre-
ferred to use an intermediary to further his political ideas, Frankfurter
was an "incessant meddler."46 Thus, his campaign to involve the coun-
try in the pre-war and World War II effort consisted, in part, of daily
contact with Roosevelt from 1939 to 194 1,47 and continuous advice to
Secretary of War Stimson, Frankfurter's choice for the post, and other
40. Id.
41. Id at 167-76.
42. Id at 182.
43. Id
44. Id at 187-88.
45. Id. at 188.
46. Id at 251.
47. Id at 189-90.
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Frankfurter-placed members of that Department."8 In addition,
Frankfurter was instrumental in bringing together American represent-
atives with important foreigners, such as Jean Monnet, a Frenchman
attached to the British Purchasing Commission," and Richard Casey,
an Australian on the British War Cabinet.5" Frankfurter also gave
Stimson an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of the 1940 "de-
stroyers for bases" agreement with Britain,5 after which he personally
reviewed numerous drafts of the Lend-Lease Bill providing military
credits to Britain.52 Paralleling Brandeis' action in furthering the estab-
lishment of the War Production Board in World War I, Frankfurter
helped to establish the Office of Production Management in 194111 and
then proceeded to help staff it and other wartime agencies to ensure a
smooth and efficient wartime effort.
54
The Supreme Court of the 1940's was exceptional for the number
of highly political men who had been appointed to it and who, while
sitting, were generally active in politics. Justices Murphy, Reed, and
Byrnes continuously offered advice to Roosevelt during World War II.
In fact, Byrnes left the Court to head the Office of Economic Stabiliza-
tion.55 Discerning a strong sense of guilt from his extrajudicial activi-
ties, Murphy notes that "Double Felix" privately politicked while the
public Frankfurter repeatedly and vociferously denied his involvement
in these activities and castigated others who seemingly violated his pro-
fessed standard of judicial monasticism. 56 As an example of this dichot-
omy, Murphy delightfully describes how Frankfurter used one set of
proteges - his clerks - for his public duties and another set of pro-
teges for his private activities, all permitted by Frankfurter's ingenious
arrangement of his judicial chambers.57
With Roosevelt's death and the end of World War II, Frank-
furter's extrajudicial political activities sharply declined, and most of
his political efforts involved securing the appointment of his candidates
to the various federal courts. For instance, Frankfurter actively pro-
moted the appointment of Charles E. Wyzanski to the District Court
for Massachusetts,58 Henry J. Friendly to the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit,59 Learned Hand to the Supreme Court,6" and Justice
48. Id at 196-204.
49. Id at 212.
50. Id at 208.
51. Id at 210-11.
52. Id at 216-20.
53. Id at 221.
54. Id at 222-25.
55. Id at 254-56.
56. Id at 258-59.
57. Id at 271-72.
58. Id. at 315-21.
59. Id at 327-38.
60. Id at 3 18-20.
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Stone to the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.6 Frank-
furter, however, was not always successful in such promotions, as evi-
denced by his failure to succeed in having Learned Hand ascend to the
High Bench. In addition, he was also unsuccessful in preventing the
appointment of some individuals he thought unworthy. For example,
Frankfurter was unable to thwart the elevation of District Court Judges
Harold R. Medina and Irving Kaufman to the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. 6
2
In setting out this historical narrative, Murphy amply demon-
strates both his thorough research abilities and his talent for weaving
material together to produce a work that flows like a well-written mys-
tery. Murphy's sensitivity to historical nuance is evident in his dis-
cussion of the early New Deal, when Brandeis' hopes for
implementation of his legislative program were less than wholeheart-
edly supported by the diverging Frankfurter.63 In this respect, the book
is an interesting examination of the extent to which the progressivism
of the early twentieth century was advocated and implemented in the
liberal reforms of the New Deal. Similarly, Murphy's sense of irony is
evident in his description of the front page of The New York Times of
October 6, 1941, in which one column reported the death of Brandeis
and the next announced Roosevelt's intention to decide whether to
modify the United States' neutral position as to the European fighting,
a goal sought by Justice Frankfurter.64
The flow of the narrative is marred, however, in two respects.
First, although Murphy included an appendix delineating the extraju-
dicial activities of the justices from 1789 to 1916,65 it would have been
more useful to have such information as a prologue to the nomination
of Brandeis in 1916. This would have given the reader a better perspec-
tive with which to understand the norms adhered to by the justices of
the Supreme Court in 1916.66
Second, the narrative is too often punctuated by the author's self-
congratulatory remarks concerning the nature of the facts revealed in
the book. Statements such as "private, formerly unpublished memo-
randum, '6 7 "until now no volume has revealed, ' 68 "documents discov-
61. Id. at 313-14.
62. Id. at 330-36.
63. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text; see also 0. GRAHAM JR., AN EN-
CORE FOR REFORM 124-25 (1967).
64. THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION 248.
65. Id at 345-63.
66. The sitting justices who engaged in some extrajudicial activities during that time
included: Chief Justice Taney, who continuously advised his friend President
Jackson, id. at 357-58; Justices McLean, Moore, and Woodbury who ran for the
presidency while sitting on the Supreme Court, id. at 356-57; Justice Story, who
drafted legislation and openly lobbied for its passage, id. at 355: and Justice
Moody, who was a member of the informal "Tennis Cabinet" of President Theo-
dore Roosevelt. Id at 363.
67. Id at 69.
68. Id at 89.
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ered in Frankfurter's private papers,"69 and "[u]npublished documents
discovered in three different sets of personal papers, ' 70 are unnecessary
emendations probably urged upon Murphy by the same editor who
wanted the book to have more market appeal. Although one unfamil-
iar with the sources would find all the information new, one who has
researched some of the sources utilized by Murphy would know that
not everything contained in the book is original. In either instance,
such self-contratulatory remarks are unnecessary.
Indeed, much of the information used by Murphy is not new at all,
but has been known for some time. For example, the role of Brandeis
and Frankfurter in the Palestine talks after World War I, the Frank-
furter-Corcoran split in 194 1,72 and Frankfurter's attempts to staff the
federal judiciary,73 are by no means new information. 4 Murphy does
deserve much credit, however, for assembling hitherto known and un-
known facts and placing them in a useful perspective.
One may also quibble with the author's occassional inconsisten-
cies, such as his various assertions that Brandeis and Frankfurter never
discussed cases pending before the Court,7 5 or that they discussed cases
but only with each other,76 or that they actually discussed cases with
someone "outside" their normal arrangements.77
In his conclusion, Murphy notes that both Brandeis and Frank-
furter should be classified among those justices who were best able to
separate their political views from their judicial decisions.78 It would
have been interesting if Murphy had discussed how Brandeis and
Frankfurter got along with their fellow justices and were able to per-
suade them to support their judicial positions. A recently published
work by Harry N. Hirsch, for example, suggests that Frankfurter's
mode of operation in the extrajudicial sphere was the same meddle-
some, sometime unctuously self-righteous, approach that he often used
when dealing with other justices. 79 Hirsch's conclusion demonstrates
that, while this pattern of behavior might have been successful in the
extrajudicial sphere, it led to the abysmal failure and rejection of his
69. Id. at 280.
70. Id. at 143.
71. Id at 55-64.
72. Id at 191-93.
73. Id at 304-41.
74. See, e.g., F. FRANKFURTER, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES chs. 15-16 (1962);
ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE 1928-1945 577-78
(Freedman ed. 1967); Murphy, A Supreme Court Justice as Politician. Felix Frank-
furter and Federal Court Appointments, 21 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 316 (1977).
75. THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION 78.
76. Id. at 83, 156.
77. Id at 141, 322-23.
78. Id. at 342.
79. H. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 127-200passim (1981).
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leadership within the court.80
Turning to the larger issues raised by his research, Murphy cor-
rectly states that both Brandeis and Frankfurter "should and will sur-
vive as giants of twentieth century America. "" Moreover, Murphy did
not find that either Brandeis or Frankfurter used his position for per-
sonal gain. " They did not bring the Supreme Court into disrepute by
any venal act. Rather, their actions were directed at "'whole institu-
tions shaped to fit the needs of the times.' "83 Both Brandeis and
Frankfurter thought, planned, and acted on a grand scale. Yet should
one applaud or even condone their extrajudicial activities? They cer-
tainly did not ascend to a High Bench that had a strict tradition of
noninvolvement in extrajudicial activities. As Murphy notes nearly
two-thirds of all Supreme Court justices have engaged in some extraju-
dicial activity."4 Nevertheless, the dissembling attempts by both men
almost forces one to believe that Brandeis and Frankfurter realized that
their extrajudicial behavior was improper, or at least would appear
improper.
In the end, Murphy refuses to take a position on whether society
should permit such extrajudicial activity, albeit preferring to note that
whatever standards are utilized must be applied uniformly. 5 Murphy
has successfully demonstrated, however, that even the most patriotic
and well intentioned acts by Brandeis and Frankfurter almost inevita-
bly led to conflicts that were badly managed. Thus, even if one could
clearly distinguish between political and nonpolitical acts, it would be
hard to distinguish the well-intentioned from those not well-inten-
tioned. In fact, it may be impossible to limit all of the extrajudicial
activities of judges. Conversely, given that the selection process of
judges encourages judicial candidates to be politically active lawyers, 6
the issue arises whether society should be realistic and, rather than
adopting an all-or-nothing approach, attempt to delineate those areas
- such as the United States Judicial Conference Committees - in
which judicial politicking is encouraged. These are some of the ques-
tions that rise above the enormously interesting personalities of Bran-
deis and Frankfurter and that ultimately make Murphy's book an
important work.
80. Id. at 177-200passim.
81. THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION 341.
82. Id. at 342.
83. Id at 247 (quoting Sen. R.F. Wagner in The Washington Post, Oct. 7, 1941, at 4,
col. 4).
84. THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION 343.
85. Id at 344.
86. See, e.g., J.W. HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL
SYSTEM ch. 4 (1981).
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